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ON THE DOING-ALLOWING DISTINCTION AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL: A 
REPLY TO DANIEL LIM 
Abstract 
In his article ‘Doing, allowing, and the problem of evil’ recently published in this journal, 
Daniel Lim attempts to undermine the following claims with respect to God: (i) the doing-
allowing distinction exists and (ii) the doing-allowing distinction is morally significant.  
I argue that Lim’s attempt is unsuccessful, and that his understanding of divine providence 
has the unacceptable consequence of implying that God is the originator of evil.  
 
=========================================================== 
In his article ‘Doing, allowing, and the problem of evil’ recently published in this 
journal,1 Daniel Lim observes that ‘the so-called Problem of Evil (PoE) is seen by many to be 
the most formidable problem for theistic belief.’(p.2). He notes that many people hold the 
following assumption: 
‘ASSUMPTION: The only way to defend theistic belief given the PoE is to assume 
God does not actively bring about everything that happens. God merely allows some things, 
in particular evil, to happen’ (p.4). 
Lim explains that this assumption is at odds with a view which he labels as 
‘PROVIDENCE’:  
‘PROVIDENCE: God actively brings about everything that happens in the world’ 
(p.2). 
He argues that ASSUMPTION depends on two claims: (i) the doing-allowing 
distinction exists and (ii) the doing-allowing distinction is morally significant.2 In the rest of 
his paper he attempts to undermine both of these claims. He concludes that broadly Kantian 
                                                          
1 DOI 10.1007/s11153-016-9569-y . 
2 Lim refers to the overview of the current literature on the doing-allowing distinction and its moral status in 
Woollard (2012a, 2012b).  
considerations (persons must always be treated as ends- in-themselves), when applied to God, 
effectively dissolve the moral significance of the doing-allowing distinction.  
I appreciate the originality and intention of Lim’s approach. However, I don’t think 
that the moral significance of the doing-allowing distinction can be dissolved when 
addressing the problem of evil. 
The first few paragraphs of the article are problematic. The first sentence states that 
‘There is a venerable thesis found in many monotheistic traditions that claims everything that 
happens in the world is a result of divine providence’ (p.1). However, this sentence is 
ambiguous. ‘Divine providence’ can be understood as 
(1) ‘God actively bringing about everything that happens in the world,’ as Lim goes 
on to state.  
‘Divine providence’ can also be understood as  
(2) ‘God actively bringing about certain events in the world, while for other events 
God places agents who are free in a libertarian sense3 in circumstances in which He knew 
they would freely and actively choose certain courses of actions, and God allows them to do 
that, thus bringing about these events in accordance with His plan.’  
Let’s call (2) the ‘Middle Knowledge’ account of divine providence.4 The doctrine of 
Middle Knowledge was classically proposed by Luis de Molina (1535–1600), a Spanish 
                                                          
3Libertarian freedom holds that a person is in some sense the ‘first cause’ of his/her free decisions and that 
he/she could have chosen otherwise. This is different from a compatibilist’s understanding of free will, which 
holds that a person’s decision is ultimately determined by prior circumstances, given which he/she could not 
have chosen otherwise. See Clarke and Capes (2015). 
4 The Middle Knowledge perspective is not the only alternative. As a reviewer for this journal points out, there 
are three standard ways theists conceptualize the relationship between divine control and human freedom, with 
Free Will theism having three important variants differing with respect to God’s knowledge:   
a.      Theological Determinism (Lim’s understanding of PROVIDENCE). 
b.      Free Will Theism: God could be all controlling.  But to the extent that God grants humans meaningful 
freedom, God has voluntarily given up control over what will occur. 
b1.    Open Theism: God knows all that has occurred and is occurring and can predict (but does not know) what 
people will freely do.  
b2.    Simple Foreknowledge: God knows all that has occurred, is occurring, and will actually occur.   
b3.    Middle Knowledge: In addition to knowing all that has occurred, is occurring, and will actually occur, God 
also knows exactly what would occur given every possible situation. 
c.      Process Theism: God cannot unilaterally control anything.  All entities always retain some power of self-
Jesuit theologian and the author of the Concordia liberi arbitrii cum gratiae donis (1588). 
According to this doctrine, God knows what any particular person would freely do in any 
circumstance. As Molina explains, Middle Knowledge is that 
‘by which, in virtue of the most profound and inscrutable comprehension of each 
faculty of free choice, He saw in His own essence what each such faculty would do 
with its innate freedom were it to be placed in this or in that or, indeed, in infinitely 
many orders of things - even though it would really be able, if it so willed, to do the 
opposite’ (Molina and Freddoso 1988, Qu.14, Art.13, Disp.52, No.9). 
This knowledge is ‘middle’ in the sense that it is conceptually between God’s natural 
knowledge (i.e. knowledge of all possibilities, including what any free creature could do in 
any set of circumstances) and God’s free knowledge (God’s knowledge of what are in fact 
true states of affairs in the actual world). According to Molina, God freely decreed to 
actualize a world known by him to be realisable on the basis of his Middle Knowledge (Craig 
and Moreland 2003, chapter 28). 
 With regards to a person’s response to God, the ‘Middle Knowledge’ account would 
hold that God’s enabling grace is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition. As Molina puts it,  
The assistance through which we are helped by God toward justification is not 
efficacious intrinsically and by its nature; rather, its being efficacious depends on the 
free consent of the faculty of choice, a consent that the will is able not to give despite 
that assistance - indeed, when it consents, it is able to dissent (Molina and Freddoso 
1988, Qu.14, Art.13, Disp.53, Part 2, No.30). 
Hence, in Molina’s account, a limited5  libertarian human freedom is included within 
God’s providential will. On this ‘Middle Knowledge’ understanding, it is not the case that 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
determination. Nevertheless, God is at every moment attempting to persuade all entities to choose the best 
available option.  
5 It is limited, because there are many other events (e.g. the time and place at which an individual is born) which 
are beyond the ability of an individual to freely decide.  
‘God actively brings about everything that happens in the world.’ Rather, some events are not 
actively brought about by God, but by free agents, and God allows them to make the choices 
and carry out their free actions. By virtue of placing free agents in circumstances in 
accordance with His Middle Knowledge of how they would freely act, God is able to 
guarantee that events come to pass in accordance with His providential will.6  
The ‘Middle Knowledge’ account of divine providence, therefore, is different from 
(1). Unlike (1), the ‘Middle Knowledge’ account of divine providence is compatible with 
ASSUMPTION. As I shall explain further below, (1) has the unacceptable consequence of 
implying that God actively brings about acts of evil that are present in this world. It is 
doubtful that this is ‘a venerable thesis found in many monotheistic traditions.’ However, (1) 
is the understanding Lim adopts; he labels the view that ‘God actively brings about 
everything that happens in the world’ as PROVIDENCE. This glosses over the fact that many 
theologians (e.g. those who affirm the Middle Knowledge view) who do not think that ‘God 
actively brings about everything’ would also use the word ‘providence’ to describe God’s 
guidance of the events of this world. Lim claims that the view which he labels as 
PROVIDENCE ‘seems to enjoy strong support from the sacred texts embedded in the various 
monotheistic traditions’ (p.2). However, the Biblical texts which seem to support this view 
can have plausible alternative interpretations; on the other hand, there are Biblical texts which 
are arguably inconsistent with this view (see Loke 2013). 
Lim discusses the following cases concerning Smith and Jones (p.5): 
                                                          
6 By saying that ‘God is able to guarantee that events come to pass in accordance with His providential will,’ I 
do not imply that all the events actualized are exactly what God desires (this is what Lim’s theological 
deterministic account of PROVIDENCE would imply). As the reviewer for this journal highlighted to me, on 
the Middle Knowledge account, there may well be many aspects of this world (the world God has chosen to 
actualize)—such as morally evil free actions—that are undesirable by-products of the world which God 
regarded was the best overall creative option, a world which contains creatures who are free in a libertarian 
sense. The counterfactuals of freedom of which the God of Middle Knowledge was aware prior to creation and 
utilized in creating the actual world of God’s choice are not themselves in any way subject to divine 
control. God simply knew what humans would do (and not do) if granted freedom in a given context. What this 
means is that God’s ability to create a world that contains what he would have it contain is restricted by the true 
counterfactuals that are available. Nevertheless, proponents of Middle Knowledge account would say that the 
granting of freedom to humans is in accordance with God’s providential will (see further, Loke 2013). 
SMITH: Smith’s young cousin is taking a bath. Smith holds the child underwater and 
the child dies.  
JONES: Jones’s young cousin is taking a bath. Jones sees the child slip, hit his head, 
and fall face down in the water. Though Jones could easily lift the child out of the water, 
Jones watches the child drown. The child dies. 
Lim goes on to question whether there is a plausible analysis of the doing-allowing 
distinction and whether this analysis can be maintained when applied to God, and he rejects 
various analyses. One of the analyses of the doing-allowing distinction which Lim considers 
is via causation. He describes this view as follows: ‘If an agent causes a given result then the 
agent’s behavior counts as an instance of doing. If an agent does not cause a given result (and 
fails to prevent it from occurring) then the agent’s behavior counts as an instance of allowing’ 
(p.9). 
He objects that ‘The most pressing issue facing this approach is the difficulty of 
pinning down a serviceable analysis of causation,’ and he notes that ‘there is no consensus in 
this area of philosophy’ (p.9). 
In reply, it is true that at present there is little agreement among philosophers 
concerning whether causation should be analyzed in terms of instantiation of regularities or 
laws or counterfactual dependence, or manipulability, probabilities or networks or INUS 
(insufficient but necessary parts of unnecessary but sufficient conditions) or transfers of 
conserved quantities or dispositions or whether causation should be treated as a theoretical 
primitive. 7 However, this lack of consensus does not imply that causation does not exist, nor 
does it imply that no distinction between doing and allowing can be drawn. One way of 
drawing the distinction would be to utilize the theory of agent causation, according to which a 
                                                          
7 For a survey of these different analyses, see Beebee, Hitchcock, and Menzies eds. (2009). They noted a 
number of reasons for the lack of agreement among philosophers, such as a vast range of theories and 
counterexamples, the fact that philosophical theories of causation are hostage to developments in the sciences, 
the concept of causation is used in many different contexts, and the fact that one’s choice of theory of causation 
can have radical consequences for other areas of philosophy (ibid., 1-2). 
free agent is the originator of his/her free actions (Clarke and Capes 2015, Section 3).8 Thus, 
if an agent is the originator of a series of events leading to a given result, then the agent’s 
behavior in bringing about the result counts as an instance of doing. If an agent is not the 
originator of a series of events leading to a given result (and does not prevent it from 
occurring), then the agent’s behavior counts as an instance of allowing. In the scenario which 
Lim goes on to mention, viz. ‘The houseplant dies because the owner fails to water it over the 
holidays’ (p.9), the owner is not the source of the series of events leading to the houseplant’s 
death, and thus this does not count as an act of doing but of allowing. 
In the rest of his article, Lim discusses a few cases and concludes that  
‘All that really seems to matter when making moral evaluations of divine behavior is 
not the doing-allowing distinction, but the Kantian distinction. Morally speaking, we 
need not worry whether God does something or merely allows it, what really matters 
is whether or not God treats a person only as means to a further end’ (p.14). 
One of the cases Lim discusses is as follows 
‘Ray is a dentist who has a son, Timothy, who has tooth decay. Ray decides to 
perform a routine dental procedure on him that he knows will be painful. That is, Ray 
decides to perform a procedure that will harm his son. Nevertheless Ray goes through 
with the procedure and his son is forced to endure pain. This is an example of doing 
harm, performing a painful dental procedure, by which Ray does not treat his son only 
as a means to a further end’ (p.14). 
I agree that ‘broadly Kantian considerations’ are important and that it may be the only 
morally significant consideration in certain cases. However, ‘broadly Kantian considerations’ 
                                                          
8 While the theory of agent causation is controversial, it has been defended in recent literature (see the survey in 
Clarke and Capes 2015). In the dialectic concerning the argument against the existence of God from evil, the 
burden of proof would be on the atheist to rule out these defences if he/she were to object to the theist’s use of 
this theory in response to the argument from evil. 
by themselves are clearly insufficient for addressing the problem of evil as a whole, which 
involves other kinds of cases.  
In particular, we need to consider the kind of cases which involve the origination of 
evil intentions and actions. Here we need to distinguish between what an agent wills 
(intention), the inherent value of the outcome which the will of the agent brings about, and 
the instrumental value of the outcome which is brought about in what God sees as the best 
overall plan for this world. There is a clear distinction between a person’s intention for 
bringing about a state of affairs and the value of the outcome—for example, a person can 
intend evil but bring about good, or vice versa. There is a clear distinction between the 
inherent value of a state of affairs brought about by human choice – for example, whether the 
state of affairs is inherently good or evil—and its instrumental value – for example, whether 
an inherently evil or an inherently good state of affairs is a necessary condition for a greater 
good or not.9 
Consider Lim’s understanding of PROVIDENCE as ‘God actively brings about 
everything that happens in the world.’ On this understanding, God actively brings about 
every evil intention and action, including the evil intentions and actions of SMITH and 
JONES. This would imply that God is the originator of evil.  
Given Lim’s view that what really matters are the ‘broadly Kantian considerations’, I 
suppose he would say that it is morally insignificant that God originates and does evil, as 
long as God has the good intention of treating persons as ends-in-themselves. But it is clearly 
problematic to say that God is the source of evil and that He does evil. It would imply that 
there is evil within the being of God, which violates the doctrine of God as a Perfect Being.  
It is also contrary to ‘the sacred texts embedded in the various monotheistic traditions’ 
(p.2) which Lim appeals to in his article; for example, it is contrary to Psalm 145:17 ‘The 
                                                          
9 I thank the reviewer for this journal for mentioning these distinctions. 
LORD is righteous in all His ways and kind in all His deeds.‘10 It should be noted that this 
verse does not imply that God will not inflict any suffering. Consider the case of Timothy 
getting a dental procedure for his tooth decay. Although the dental procedure causes pain and 
suffering, the intention is to treat the teeth, and what it achieves is good. One might therefore 
argue that the moral evaluation of such instances of suffering should not be done by 
considering the suffering in and of itself. Rather one has to take into consideration what 
suffering achieves, i.e. the instrumental value of the suffering. Thus the affirmation that God 
is righteous and kind in all His deeds does not imply that He would not inflict suffering. 
However, the moral evaluation of intention is another matter. The intention of someone 
wanting to torture a child for fun is evil, regardless of the outcome. Thus the affirmation that 
God is righteous and kind in all His deeds does imply that He would not actively bring about 
intentions and actions that are morally evil, such as (say) Smith torturing a child for fun, or 
someone hating God.11 The only way to avoid the conclusion that God is the originator of 
evil is to give up Lim’s view of PROVIDENCE12, to embrace an alternative view of divine 
providence and to defend ASSUMPTION.  
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